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ABSTRACT
Social scientists, like those performing research at the Kinsey
Institute for Research in Sex, Gender and Reproduction, may
use surveys to gather large amounts of sensitive data. Unlike
purely medical-related datasets, these social science datasets
tend to be sparse and high-dimensional, which presents op-
portunities to characterize participants in the dataset in unique
ways. These unique characterizations may enable individu-
als to be linked to external data in ways that have not been
previously considered. Therefore, traditional approaches to
de-identifying data, such as fulfilling HIPAA requirements,
may not be sufficient for preventing the re-identification of
participants in large social science datasets.
In this paper, we evaluate the statistical characteristics of
two high-dimensional social science datasets to better un-
derstand how unique features impact privacy. We apply a
class of statistical de-anonymization attacks in an attempt
to achieve theoretical re-identification of participants. We
assume that an attacker has exact knowledge of a subset of
attribute values for a particular record, and wants to link
this subset of data to the actual record to discover the re-
maining content. We show that although 98% of the records
within the dataset are unique given any three attributes,
re-identification of the records may not be easily achieved.
We attribute limited re-identification to the inherent sim-
ilarity in the human behavior that the scientists measure.
This work is the first to characterize re-identification risks in
high-dimensional data that is collected in surveys designed
to capture the various behaviors and experiences of groups
of individuals.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The sharing of medical data has many advantages, includ-
ing: the creation of a unified data display for clinicians, the
development of predictive and diagnostic support systems,
reductions in institutional costs, and improvements in med-
ical care. Medical data are often not shared with external
parties because even when data is de-identified per HIPAA
Safe Harbor rules, sharing of such data may introduce pri-
vacy risks. This is because privacy does not only depend
on de-identified data but also on context-specific informa-
tion, such as shared demographic data of subjects, presence
of fields that may be linked across other existing databases,
social relationships among subjects, and profiles of the data
recipient.
Preserving the privacy of medical-related data is even more
challenging when the data are obtained from studies that cre-
ate unique profiles of individual participants. These partic-
ipant profiles can be so unique that traditional anonymiza-
tion techniques cannot be used to generalize and de-identify
the record. Therefore sharing these data with external par-
ties may become a lengthy process of negotiating specific use
agreements. Sharing of the data among researchers within
the organization that owns the data also risks privacy. Even
when traditional identifiers are removed, the uniqueness of
these records may make re-identification easy for anyone who
has access to the complete record.
Privacy is important to social science researchers, like those
at The Kinsey Institute for Research in Sex, Gender, and
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Reproduction, because they depend upon participants pro-
viding accurate answers about their personal behaviors. In
this paper we evaluate two datasets from the Kinsey Insti-
tute. These datasets were specifically collected as part of
research projects designed to enhance the understanding of
behavioral and psychosocial factors related to risk for human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and other sexually transmit-
ted infections (STI) as well as other risks to well-being. As
sexuality-related data are considered sensitive, they require
protection of both confidentiality and privacy—a shared fea-
ture with other types of health data. If participants provide
inaccurate information, researchers may make incorrect con-
clusions with consequences for public health. The protection
of data like these serves two purposes: to protect partici-
pants’ privacy and, through that, to help encourage them to
give accurate answers to increase the quality of research. For
participants to give accurate information, they must trust
that the researchers will strive to protect their information
from breaches in confidentiality and invasions of privacy. Re-
searchers must balance three interests in the development
and sharing of datasets: 1) the desire to collect data on a
range of variables that alone or in combination may risk re-
identification; 2) the increasing pressure from the scientific
and medical communities as well as funding and regulatory
agencies that datasets be made available to others; and 3)
human subjects concerns such as potential breaches in con-
fidentiality and privacy.
The goal of this work is to create an understanding of
uniqueness and re-identification vulnerability in high-dimen-
sional social science datasets that contain demographic, med-
ical and behavioral data. This data is high-dimensional be-
cause each record contains many attributes and each at-
tribute may have many possible values. Each attribute/value
combination can be viewed as a dimension. Such high-dimen-
sional microdata (i.e. information about specific individuals)
are often sparse, meaning that there are no similar records
within the multi-dimensional space.
We make the following contributions: First we analyze
the data and characterize uniqueness and sparsity of records
within the dataset. We also introduce a uniqueness similarity
measure which helps to further characterize the data. The
results of this analysis are not limited to the datasets that we
evaluated, but may be applied to datasets that have similar
size and are constructed using similar survey techniques. Ad-
ditionally, we adapt a class of de-anonymization attacks by
Narayanan and Shmatikov [7] and demonstrate the likelihood
of re-identification when an attacker has exact information.
We use exact information to establish the best-case scenario
for an adversary trying to execute re-identification. We in-
troduce error to the auxiliary information to create a more
realistic attack scenario. We assume that an attacker has
some subset of attribute values for a specific record and some
information that identifies the individual associated with the
record. The attacker’s goal is to link the partial information
to the complete record. We limit the amount of information
that an attacker may have, but not the type.
The outline of this paper is as follows: Section 2 is related
work in re-identification, Section 3 details our methods and
results, Section 4 presents our discussion and interpretation
of those results, and Section 5 concludes with future and on-
going work.
2. RELATED WORK
Medical datasets contain information that both patients
and providers have a vested interest in keeping private. Open
government laws and data-sharing policies of funding agen-
cies, such as the National Institutes of Health and the Na-
tional Science Foundation, may require these data to be shared
in some form. This sharing may pose substantial risk to pri-
vacy.
As we have seen from Sweeney’s work with Massachusetts
hospital discharge records [9], there is a risk of re-identification
even from sanitized datasets. Sweeney was able to re-identify
the then-governor of Massachusetts by linking the hospital
discharge record to a voter registration database. She used
only his birth date, gender, and zip code. This work intro-
duced the concept of looking not only at what pieces of infor-
mation are explicitly identifying, such as name, social security
number, address, and phone number, but also what could be
identifying. Such variables are considered quasi-identifiers,
information with which an adversary can re-identify a per-
son by linking it with other datasets.
Genomic data is a type of medical microdata receiving ex-
tensive attention. Malin and Sweeney linked many genomic
datasets together to re-identify people in [5] using disease
genes. The presence of a disease gene in a medical facil-
ity’s record indicates a patient visit, and these visits were
correlated to re-identify. In similar work [6], they linked dis-
ease genes with anonymized clinical and DNA reports from
hospitals. Malin identified family relations in [4] by linking
de-identified pedigrees to online genealogy datasets and on-
line newspaper death records. De-identified pedigrees consist
of only family structures with gender and death status. No-
table here is that the author did not use official data sources
(hospital, governmental, etc.). Instead, he used possibly er-
roneous online sources and validated his findings with the
Social Security Death Index. This is an example of how un-
official sources can just as easily lead to privacy risks.
Some of those unofficial sources have been considered im-
pervious. In 2006 AOL released three months of anonymized
Internet searches. This led to the re-identification of some
users using only their search queries [1]. Likewise, social net-
works’ privacy weaknesses are becoming more and more of
a concern, even when it is possible to make profiles ‘private’
[11]. Narayanan and Shmatikov have evaluated the Netflix
Prize dataset [7], which had been ‘anonymized’ by removing
all information other than movie ratings and date of rating,
for each movie. While this information is not linkable to
any outside governmental database, an adversary who has
some prior knowledge of an individual’s taste in movies can
reconstruct an entire Netflix Prize record.
While there has been extensive work in medical-related
datasets, very large and sparse microdatasets, and social net-
works, no previous work looks at how social science datasets
can pose a risk to participant privacy. They are unlike medical-
related and microdatasets because individual attributes are
much richer. They are also far more high-dimensional than
medical-related datasets tend to be and less sparse than mi-
crodatasets. This work builds upon our previous work in
[8].
3. RESULTS
We explore uniqueness, similarity, and re-identification for
two datasets from The Kinsey Institute. The datasets con-
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tain participants who have answered some subset of 332 ques-
tions from a sexual health survey. The survey consists of
multiple modules, including: Background, Mood and Sex-
uality Questionnaire (MSQ), Sexual Inhibition and Sexual
Excitation Scales (SIS/SES), Kinsey Institute Sexual Behav-
ior Questionnaire (KISBQ), State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(STAI) and Zemore Depression Proneness Rating (ZDPR).
MSQ assesses how mood (i.e. anger/frustration, anxiety/sad-
ness, happiness/cheerfulness, and sadness/depression) affects
sexuality. SIS/SES measures sexual inhibition and sexual
excitation scales. KISBQ evaluates various risky sexual be-
haviors. STAI measures anxiety proneness. ZPDR esti-
mates depression proneness. Questions from SIS/SES, MSQ,
STAI, and ZDPR are largely multiple choice and those within
background and KISBQ are a mix of multiple choice, nu-
merical entry, and text entry. Important to note is that
SIS/SES, MSQ, STAI, and ZDPR are standardized sexual
health scales. A scale is a questionnaire with which you hope
to measure a psychological construct, with multiple questions
(also called items or, for scales, indicators) [2]. In general,
the steps for developing a scale include the development of
questions that are relevant to the construct. After a large
number of subjects answer all the questions, factor analysis
is used to select items that are relevant to the construct and
eliminate ones that are not. Factor analysis removes items
that are very skewed (e.g., if 90% answer that they ‘can be
shy at times’, that is not a good item to measure introver-
sion, as you hope to be measuring a trait in which people
vary). For our Kinsey datasets, the scores from the scaled
modules SIS/SES, ZDPR, and STAI approximate a normal
distribution. Scores from MSQ do not generally follow a nor-
mal distribution.
Dataset 1 contains 10865 participants who were recruited
from a small Midwestern town using newspaper advertise-
ments, fliers, etc. Dataset 2 contains 5931 participants and
is a convenience sample of individuals within the USA that
visited the Kinsey Institute’s website. The background and
demographic data for participants in Dataset 1 are more sim-
ilar than for Dataset 2, which allows us to compare and con-
trast how uniqueness and similarity impact re-identification.
All participants within both datasets have answered some
subset of 332 sexual health survey questions. Participants
from Dataset 1 were given a 20-question experimental mod-
ule. This module was not included in the survey that was
administered to participants in Dataset 2. Dataset 1 was
not processed for missing values, nor were extreme values re-
coded or outliers removed. Dataset 2 has been processed for
missing values.
3.1 Uniqueness
As Malin states in [4], one needs uniqueness and linkage
to successfully re-identify. Our uniqueness analyses suggests
that almost any attribute, either by itself or in combina-
tion with another, can be used to make a participant unique.
Even answers to multiple choice questions, such as whether
one has cheated on one’s spouse (yes, no, or not applicable),
can be combined to uniquify1 participants.
1The term ‘uniquify’ refers to the reduction of the query
population to a single participant. A participant’s answers
to a survey question or set of survey questions is unique if
they are the only person to provide those specific answers.
Evaluation Category % Total % NT*
Uniquified by 1 answer 36.31 3.76
Uniquified by 2-answer combinations 79.27 54.61
Uniquified by 2-answer combinations, 42.96 –
but not 1 answer
Uniquified by 3-answer combinations 97.6 –
Uniquified in more than 100 ways 14.88 7.48
Uniquified in more than 20 ways 36.52 22.77
* NT: No text-entry answers. Text-entry answers are most
often trivially unique, e.g. “Aderall, Advaire” could be unique
due to misspellings. We believe that omitting them gives a
more accurate picture of uniquification.
Table 1: Initial results of simple data analyses on
Dataset 1.
Evaluation Category % Total % NT
Uniquified by 1 answer 52.87 5.56
Uniquified by 2-answer combinations 83.70 68.61
Uniquified by 2-answer combinations, 37.31 –
but not 1 answer
Uniquified by 3-answer combinations 100 –
Uniquified in more than 100 ways 23.92 21.02
Uniquified in more than 20 ways 50.59 44.82
Table 2: Initial results of simple data analyses on
Dataset 2.
We ask the following questions of the data:
• How many participants are unique in various combina-
tions of fields?
• How many fields must be combined before 100%, or
nearly 100%, of participants have at least 1 unique an-
swer or combination of answers?
• Which fields make participants more vulnerable than
others?
• Are text-entry fields more vulnerable than multiple-
choice fields?
• Does partitioning the fields, such as by survey module,
affect a participant’s vulnerability?
• Do participants provide unique answers to the same
questions?2
• Can uniquification predict other factors about a partic-
ipant?3
Tables 1 and 2 summarize results and show that even when
considering only two data fields, or survey questions, over
50% of the participants within the datasets are unique. When
2This question is explored in the following section in Unique-
ness Similarity.
3This question is more relevant to social sciences, as it refers
to behavioral predictions, but has implications for privacy as
well.
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Module % Singles % Doubles
Background 26.96 36.68
Demographics 3.40 13.57
General Health 23.77 5.41
Sexual Behavior 1.84 7.72
MSQ .03 .62
KISBQ 2.62 6.71
SIS/SES .01 .01
STAI .01 .02
ZDPR .12 .81
Table 3: Results of intra-module uniqueness, looking
only within the stated module.
Module % Singles % Doubles
Background 39.56 49.06
Demographics 4.84 15.39
General Health 35.69 8.34
Sexual Behavior 3.33 13.64
MSQ 0 1.99
KISBQ 7.23 13.79
SIS/SES 0 .73
STAI 0 .017
ZDPR 0 2.43
Table 4: Results of intra-module uniqueness for
Dataset 2, as in Table 3.
considering three attributes, everyone in Dataset 2 and al-
most everyone in Dataset 1 has at least one unique combi-
nation. To determine uniqueness, we compare each partic-
ipants’ answers to every other participants’ answers. Com-
binations are unique if the combination of both answers is
unique, not if both in the combination are singly unique.
Answers for which a participant is singly unique are not
considered in combination analysis because all combinations
with such answers would be trivially unique. In combinations
of three, combinations of two that would make participants
trivially unique in many combinations of three were not re-
moved, but singly unique attributes were. Dataset 2 shows
higher uniquification rates in all categories. This is probably
due to population size, though population origin (around the
US as opposed to only within a single Midwestern town) may
also have contributed.
Tables 3 and 4 summarize results in intra-module unique-
ness analysis. The modules are split into scaled modules and
unscaled. The results show higher uniquification rates for
Background and KISBQ modules for Dataset 2 in compari-
son to Dataset 1. We attribute this increase to the more di-
verse population in Dataset 2. Additionally, individuals with
similar backgrounds also exhibit similar risky sexual behavior
(i.e. KISBQ). Most of the modules are standardized sexual
health scales, which may produce a normal distribution of
responses. Given a normal distribution, we expect partici-
pant answers to be less unique, which explains why so few
participants are uniquified within scaled modules.
Evaluation Category # Questions
Uniquifies no one, singletons: 230
Uniquifies no one, 2-combinations: 29
Table 5: This table shows how many questions are
not used in uniquification of any participant.
Evaluation Category # Questions
Uniquifies no one, singletons: 259
Uniquifies no one, 2-combinations: 2
Table 6: As in Table 5, but for Dataset 2. Dataset 2
contains 312 fields to Dataset 1’s 332.
Tables 5 and 6 present the number of questions for which
there are no unique answers. When considered individually,
most questions are not uniquifying, but almost 90% of ques-
tions present can be used in combination with some other
question to uniquify at least one participant (or 99% for
Dataset 2).
Results in uniqueness suggest that correlating answers to
multiple questions may create significant re-identification vul-
nerabilities. If all participants have at least one unique com-
bination of attributes starting with as few as three, the ad-
versary’s challenge becomes finding those combinations.
3.2 Similarity Measures
In addition to what makes participants unique, we have
investigated ways by which participants are similar. We use
a modified cosine similarity as used in [7] for our general
similarity:
Σ Sim(r1i, r2i)
||support(r1) ∪ support(r2)|| (1)
The support is the set of attributes for which a participant
has a numerical value. Sim outputs 1 if the value for at-
tribute i for both records, r1 and r2, is the same and 0 other-
wise. Our results for the nearest neighbor over all attributes
for Datasets 1 and 2 are found in Figure 1. We see that par-
ticipants’ nearest neighbors tend to be very close compared
to participants in the Netflix Prize dataset[7].
Indeed, where no Netflix Prize participants had a nearest
neighbor over 50% similar, over 75% of the participants in
Dataset 1 are at least 50% similar to their nearest neighbor.
Dataset 2 exhibits a sharp decline in similarity, as only 2.5%
are at least 50% similar but over 84% are at least 40% similar.
This suggests that the datasets are far less sparse than the
Netflix Prize dataset.
Figure 2 examines how similar participants are with mod-
ules. In Dataset 1 not every participant has answered every
module, which is why there is a large percentage with a near-
est neighbor at 0% for the KISBQ and STAI modules. In
Dataset 2, nearly every participant has answered every mod-
ule (though not every question within every module). These
graphs give an idea of where the similarity most likely comes
from in overall nearest neighbor. Our similarity results con-
firm that the background of participants in Dataset 1 are
more similar than in Dataset 2. Similarly, while risky sex-
ual behaviors (KISBQ) has high similarity results for both
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Figure 2: Line histograms of similarity to nearest neighbor within modules. The scaled modules (MSQ,
STAI, ZDPR, and SIS) have predictably higher similarity trends than the unscaled surveys (background
and KISBQ). Dataset 1 has a significant proportion of 0% similar neighbors in modules because not every
participant took every survey. Dataset 2 has been cleaned to contain only those that answered every survey.
datasets, the similarity values for Dataset 1 are much higher.
We attribute this increased similarity to the highly similar
backgrounds for participants in Dataset 1. Additionally, for
scaled modules, we have consistently higher similarity values
for the two datasets. Given a normal distribution, we expect
participant answers to be more similar, which explains why
the two datasets have consistent similarity results for scaled
modules.
The second similarity measure is uniqueness similarity. It
shows how participants’ uniquification can be similar (e.g.
many participants have unique values for number of sexual
partners, but very few have unique values for multiple choice
questions within scaled modules).
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Figure 1: Line histograms of similarity to nearest
neighbor for Datasets 1 and 2. Unlike the Netflix
dataset on which our similarity work is based, the
nearest neighbor in the Kinsey datasets tend to be
fairly similar.
Σ Unique V alue(r1i, r2i)
||usupport(r1) ∪ usupport(r2)|| (2)
Here, usupport is the size of the set of unique features. The
Unique V alue function outputs 1 if r1 and r2 have (a) unique
value(s) for attribute set i and 0 otherwise.
Figures 3 and 4 give our results for uniqueness similarity
in singletons and doubles. In singletons, most participants
have no unique attributes and participants that do tend to
have only one. When participants are unique, they have
unique values for the same attributes. In combinations of
two attributes, most participants are unique in at least one
combination. Those that are unique again tend to be unique
in the same attributes, thus the spike at 100% similarity.
3.3 Experimental Re-Identification
In previous sections, our results show that most partic-
ipants have unique characteristics, which may lead one to
assume that they may be easily linked to some external, iden-
tifying information. On the other hand, our results also show
that participants have higher similarity values than those
in other microdata. Therefore, in this section we perform
experimental re-identification to assess how uniqueness and
similarity impact an attacker’s ability to re-identify.
We have adapted Narayanan and Shmatikov’s simple score-
board algorithm [7] to perform a theoretical re-identification
of participants in the Kinsey Institute datasets. The score-
board algorithm works as follows:
• Select a participant record and extract a random selec-
tion of attributes from it as the auxiliary information.
• Compare the auxiliary information against all of the
Figure 3: Histogram of nearest neighbor uniqueness
similarity for singletons. This graph depicts how of-
ten participants are unique in the same attributes.
Figure 4: As in Figure 3, but for combinations of two
attributes.
records in the dataset using LesserSim (essentially the
numerator of Equation (1)):
LesserSim: output 1 if all attributes match, 0 otherwise
If any attribute does not match, LesserSim fails (the
record is not similar to the auxiliary information).
• If a record matches according to LesserSim, add it to
the matching set. If only one record is in the matching
set after the algorithm terminates and no error has been
added, the record is re-identified. If error has been
added, it could be a false positive.
Our theoretical adversary has some subset of attribute values
for a specific record. The attacker’s goal is to link the partial
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information to the complete record. We limit the adversary
within the following experimental parameters:
• the number of attributes in the auxiliary set,
• the subset of attributes from which the auxiliary infor-
mation is taken, either randomly chosen or specifically
chosen, and
• whether random error is applied to the auxiliary infor-
mation.
The amount of error that can be applied to a given attribute
depends on the range of possible values for that attribute.
Numerical entry attributes and scaled scores have a far larger
range of permissible values than multiple choice and this is
reflected in error that is added to them. When calculating
similarity, we extend the threshold for acceptable values to
reflect the amount of error that can be added.
We perform two sets of experimental re-identifications. In
the first set of experiments, we randomly choose auxiliary
information from either the entire attribute set or from spe-
cific modules. In the second set of experiments, the auxiliary
information consists of the most uniquifying attributes.
In the first set of experiments, we performed 500 experi-
ments on each participant for randomly selected attributes.
A subset of four or nine randomly chosen attributes is formed
from a participant’s record and matched against the dataset
to see if we can reduce the re-identification set to 1 (the
correct match). We took the median of the size of the re-
ported matching set for each participant’s set of trials. Fig-
ures 5 and 6 present the center and spread4 of the number
of records that match the auxiliary information. If there is
only one record that matches the auxiliary information, the
experiment is ‘successful’: the adversary has re-identified the
target. In cases where error has been added to the auxiliary
information, this could be a false positive—instead of finding
the record that sourced the auxiliary information, it instead
finds an entirely different record.
Tables 7 and 8 show the frequency of re-identifications
when we select attributes based on which are the most uniquify-
ing. One set of experiments excludes scaled scores. Although
they are amongst the top uniquifying attributes, it is likely
that only insiders would know a participant’s scores. Calcu-
lated scores are not shared with participants. To simulate
a case where the adversary is not an insider and could con-
ceivably know anything that the participant also knows, we
remove calculated scores from auxiliary information. We ran-
domly chose a set of attributes to act as controls. They were
chosen once and used for both datasets. These attributes
have a mix of uniquification rates and represent a typical case
in that we did not select them for their uniquifying proper-
ties. In all experiments with added error, we ran 20 trials
for each participant. Without added error, we run only one
experiment per individual because there are no random ele-
ments.
When the adversary has exact knowledge and the size of
the matching set is one, a participant is re-identified. When
4The median is the thick central line in the boxes. The upper
and lower horizontal lines signify the third and first quartile
respectively. The small lines attached to the vertical lines
(the ‘whiskers’) represent the minimum and maximum. Cir-
cles beyond the minima and maxima are outliers, calculated
as being outside 3 · median.
error is added, experiments can result in false positives and
misses. False positives occur when the size of the matching
set is one, but the record is not the same as the source of
the auxiliary information. Misses occur when the size of the
matching set is zero, that is, when adding error has brought
the auxiliary information out of range of all records. Table 8
gives results for selected attributes with added error. It gives
rates of re-identifications, false positives, and misses.
% Re-Identifications
Attr. Set Dataset 1 Dataset 2
Top 9 0 100
Top 9, No Scores 0 99.56
Random 9 0 42.20
Top 4 0 97.47
Top 4, No Scores 0 93.24
Random 4 0 1.92
Table 7: Percent of participants re-identified when
we specifically select certain attributes for the ad-
versary’s auxiliary information. Here, the auxiliary
information is correct.
% Re-identifications
Attr. Set Dataset 1 (*)(**) Dataset 2 (*)(**)
Top 9 0 (0)(0) 3.59 (31.99)(11.24)
Top 9, No Scores 0 (0)(0.03) 4.47 (4.91)(3.11)
Random 9 0 (0)(37.46) 0 (60.59)(10.70)
Top 4 0 (0)(0) 1.03 (2.46)(2.09)
Top 4, No Scores 0 (0(0) 0.51 (0)(0)
Random 4 0 (0)(2.18) 0.01 (9.48)(1.52)
*: % trials resulting in matching set of size 0
**: % false positive
Table 8: As in Table 7, but error was added to the
auxiliary information. False positive and miss rates
are also given.
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that uniquification rates for our datasets
are notably high. While few individuals have singly unique
attributes, combining attributes (e.g. ‘Who over the age of 30
has had 10 or more sexual partners in the last year?’) yields
very high uniquification rates. When considering combina-
tions of three attributes, the percentage of unique records ap-
proaches or meets 100%. Our evaluation of Dataset 1 shows
that participants with similar backgrounds provide similar
answers to questions about sexual behavior and psychologi-
cal state. Despite the high uniquification rates, records tend
to be very similar to their nearest neighbors. In Dataset 1,
more than 75% of records have nearest neighbors that are
at least 50% similar across all attributes. Participants in
Dataset 2 have dissimilar backgrounds and therefore the an-
swers that they provide are predictably more unique and less
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Figure 5: Results of experimental re-identification when the adversary’s knowledge is exact. The auxiliary
information was drawn randomly from specific attribute pools. The box and whisker plots give the median
number of matching records for the test condition and the spread, showing the first and third quartiles and
the minimum and maximum matching set size. Points outside the minima and maxima are outliers.
similar overall. Despite higher uniqueness, more than 84% of
the participants in Dataset 2 are at least 40% similar overall.
Scaled modules contribute the most to overall similarity,
with some participants providing the exact same responses
to questions from these modules. Background information
(demographics, health information, and sexual background)
generates the least similar nearest neighbor scores. Given
this information we conclude that questions that are most
likely to uniquify participants are also least likely to con-
tribute to similarity.
Our random approach to experimental re-identification se-
lects attributes at random from various attribute subsets.
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Figure 6: As in Figure 5, but error was added to simulate an adversary’s inexact knowledge.
These experiments tend to yield large matching sets, which
limits an attacker’s ability to re-identify participants. Ex-
perimental re-identification using only scaled modules gives
much lower success rates than unscaled, as seen in Figures 5
and 6 for Dataset 1. Dataset 2 matching set sizes are smaller
than the corresponding sizes in Dataset 1. Therefore we con-
clude that participants in a sample drawn from more diverse
population are exposed to greater privacy risks.
When auxiliary information consists of the most uniquify-
ing attributes and participants are drawn from a diverse pop-
ulation, an attacker is more likely to re-identify participants.
Our results show that for Dataset 2, 93% to 100% of the
participants can be re-identified. On the other hand, given
the same test scenario, no participants from Dataset 1 can
be re-identified. Although there are no re-identifications for
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Dataset 1, the size of the matching set was usuall very small;
a size of 2 was common.
To create a more realistic scenario, we add error to the
auxiliary information. Adding error has two interesting side-
effects: false positives and misses. False positives occur when
the size of the matching set is one, but the record is not the
same as the source of the auxiliary information. Misses occur
when the size of the matching set is zero, that is, when adding
error has brought the auxiliary information out of range of all
records. Miss rates could be considered a measure of sparsity.
The amount of error we add to variables is small. The fact
that this amount of error brings auxiliary information outside
the range of all records means that unique values are far apart
from each other. Our uniqueness similarity results show that
participants tend to be unique in the same attributes, at
least for singletons and combinations of two attributes. It
appears that this trend does not continue up to four and
nine attribute combinations.
5. FUTURE WORK
We have performed extensive analyses of two social science
datasets from The Kinsey Institute. We have investigated
uniqueness, similarity, and experimental re-identification at-
tacks. Our results show high uniquification rates: nearly
100% of participants have at least one unique three-attribute
combination. However, the remainder of their records tends
to be very similar. Scaled modules tend to have much lower
uniquification rates and background information has the high-
est.
Overall, most participants’ nearest neighbor is more than
50% similar (more than 40% in Dataset 2). In module-
specific similarity, scaled modules are predictably far more
similar. Experimental re-identification attacks show that
there are relatively few successful re-identifi-cations when
auxiliary information is randomly chosen. For Dataset 2,
re-identification is more likely when auxiliary information is
chosen from the most uniquifying attributes. Dataset 1 shows
more resistance to re-identification, but the matching set size
is still low.
Our goal is to specify a protection model and mechanism
for social science datasets. Our results suggest that aggregat-
ing data based on its uniqueness properties, whether within
modules or the entire dataset, could mitigate privacy risks.
We suggest exploring privacy-preserving techniques such as
differential privacy [3] [10] and its impact on data utility. We
will investigate whether the most uniquifying attributes are
available online or in other datasets.
Ultimately, we believe that preserving participant privacy
in these datasets and ones like them will be an exercise in
risk management and balance. We must decide what is an
acceptable level of risk, taking into account both data vul-
nerability and its required utility in the research for which it
was collected.
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